102 Fensham chides us for not making an explicit reference to The Precautionary Principle 103 published by UNESCO in 2005, for he sees it as a re-wording of the importance of 104 scientific scepticism and how it should be used by scientists. We certainly explained what 105 the IPCC was charged to tackle in respect of global warming, all of its reports explicitly 106 looking at AGW and therefore predicated on precaution. Perhaps more significantly, we 107 would observe that the final sections of the UNESCO (2005) report concerned with 'Social 108 and cultural implications' are strikingly scant about education and the schooling of future 109 scientists and citizens. There were evidently no deliberations amongst the writers of that 110 report about how future scientists might be taught-despite the 'E' in UNESCO and 'the 111 ethics of scientific knowledge' being in the subtitle of the report! 112
Focusing more specifically on interpretations of the precautionary principle, it is 113 interesting to note that it is by no means universally accepted within the scientific com-114 munity where it has been criticized on grounds that it is conceptually ill defined (Sandin 115 et al. 2002) ; theoretically incoherent (Peterson 2006) ; potentially absolutist in nature 116 (Nollkaemper 1996) ; largely based around value judgments (Charnley 2000) ; potentially 117 leads to increased risk-taking (Sandin et al. 2002) ; and is unscientific and could lead to the 118 marginalizing of science (Gray and Bewers 1996) . The precautionary principle has become 119 something of a mantra of the environmentalist movement, which leaves it open to claims 120 that it is a 'political' principle rather than one which is scientifically based. Scepticism 
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The problem with invoking the precautionary principle is neatly summed up by Henk 122 van der Belt (2003) 128 While we certainly accept that the precautionary principle is, as its proponents assert, 129 already ''enshrined'' in such international agreements as the Convention on Biological 130 Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, it could be argued that existing 131 definitions are at best partial or incomplete, and at worst, fail to spell out the precise 132 conditions that require to be fulfilled before it may be invoked or clearly specifies the 133 nature of the preventative action that has to be taken (van der Belt 2003, p. 1123). 134
The general appeal of the principle makes it a natural candidate for political consensus 135 among a public otherwise deeply divided about environmental policies. Furthermore, 136 adherents to the precautionary principle tend to subscribe to the view that governments 137 around the world should take precautions to protect public health and the environment, even 138 in the absence of clear evidence of harm as a consequence, and notwithstanding the costs of 139 such action. In the case of climate change it could be argued that the annual costs involved 140 with the application of such a 'political' principle could inflict significant damage to the 141 economies of the developed and developing nations since the proscribed solution would 142 involve governments spending enormous sums of public money to mitigate the effects of 143 climate change (in the case of developed nations) and could deprive developing countries of 144 the means by which they might increase the rate of their economic development. 145
However, a worrying perspective on the precautionary principle has emerged recently, 146 which advocates a shift in the burden of proof toward those who advocate a new science 147 and technology or activity. Reversing the burden of proof amounts to substituting the 148 maxim ''guilty until proven innocent'' for the age-old legal principle ''innocent until 149 proven guilty'' (van der Belt 2003, p. 1125). Even more worrying is the call by Kevin 150 Trenberth (a leading climate scientist and IPCC author) that in the case of climate science, 151 ''Given that global warming is ''unequivocal'', and is ''very likely'' due to human activ-152 ities, to quote the 2007 IPCC report, the null hypothesis should now be reversed, thereby 153 placing the burden of proof on showing that there is no human influence'' (Trenberth 154 2011) . 155
Trenberth's argument for reversing the burden of proof hinges on whether the IPCC's 156 evidence and arguments meet an appropriate standard of proof, which in Bryce and Day 157 (2014) we suggest is far from scientifically unproblematic (or, it could be argued, ethical). 158 The commonly used levels of proof are the preponderance of evidence, clear and con-159 vincing evidence, and beyond reasonable doubt. If science is to carry on testing hypotheses 160 (as it undoubtedly will), what of Trenberth's suggestion that we should assume human 161 influence unless proved otherwise? It is doubtful that his argument would find much 162 support within the wider scientific community. The key point missed by Trenberth is that 163 while human influence may now be 'playing some role' in the rise of global temperatures, 164 the incidence of intense storms is likely to decrease, not increase, by the late twenty-first 165 century, according to the computer simulations carried out by Zahn and Storch (2010) . 166 North Atlantic polar lows should become less frequent, not more frequent, if and as global 167 temperatures rise. Only when the signal of anthropogenic influence on extreme weather 168 becomes overwhelming (which looks to be some way off at present) will it make sense to T. G. K. Bryce What is particularly worrying about Trenberth's train of thought is that it highlights that 172 some climate scientists (alarmists) consider that climate science is somehow different from 173 the rest of science, believing that in the name of precaution, they can turn 400 years of 174 scientific thought on its head. 175
Which brings us back to the question of how best to discuss the precautionary principle 176 with students and how we teach our students to trust scientists? Are we really to accept the 177 precautionary principle at face value? Should we present the precautionary principle to our 178 students as if it is unproblematic? While we agree that teachers ought to discuss the 179 precautionary principle as part of classroom discussions on climate change, we would 180 suggest that, if introduced uncritically, it might possibly present more problems since it 181 could be used to close down discussion rather than promote open debate. As for teaching 182 our students to 'trust' scientists, the above example shows that the politically motivated 183 views of some climate scientists make it difficult for science teachers to present the climate 184 science (and several climate scientists) as trustworthy, hence our suggestion that science 185 teachers need to carefully educate their students to critically scrutinize the science for 186 confirmation bias as well as political motivation.
IPCC's fourth and fifth reports (AR4 and AR5)
188 Most interestingly, Fensham states that the very recent fifth report of the IPCC (which 189 came out after our paper was published) ''answers many of [our] concerns about climate 190 change''. Our article had looked closely at the fourth IPCC report (AR4) of 2007. This 191 raises two observations immediately. First, it is indeed striking how different the reports 192 are in style and presentation. The more recent report (2013) is much more upfront and 193 explicit on the extent of the confidence which can be placed on predictions of climatic 194 change rates. Caution and scepticism is the order of the day (with forecasts worsening on 195 the whole). Second, summaries and reports for policy makers are also now very promi-196 nent-and fairly comprehensible; the sense of a wide readership is much greater than 197 before. In that regard, the sceptics among the public and in scientific communities would 198 seem to have been influential in the intervening 6 years: much more is now demanded of 199 scientists regarding what and how they report. Sceptical scientists haven't gone away of 200 course and it is interesting that when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 201 (IPCC) consensus published that 5th report (AR5), there appeared a counter-consensus 202 publication from the NIPCC (the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate 203 Change). [One is tempted to ask whether the rather similar title/acronym was used to 204 confuse the careless journalist.] More seriously, the contents of the two reports are very 205 different. The main difference between AR5 and the NIPCC report is that they come to 206 opposing conclusions using largely similar evidence but, in the case of the NIPCC report, 207 with less politically emotive, more scientifically nuanced language. 208
Looking specifically at the level of certainty expressed within the science portrayed 209 within the AR5, Daniel Botkin who testified before the US house sub-committee on 210 science, space, and technology on May 29, 2014 drew attention to the view that 211 … both the reports [IPPC AR5 and the US National Climate Assessment] present a 212 number of speculative, and sometimes incomplete, conclusions embedded in lan-213 guage that gives them more scientific heft than they deserve. The reports are ''sci-214 entific-sounding'' rather than based on clearly settled facts or admitting their lack. Scepticism 
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Established facts about the global environment exist less often in science than lay-216 men usually think… The rate of change we are experiencing is also not unprece-217 dented, and the ''mystery'' of the warming ''plateau'' simply indicates the inherent 218 complexity of our global biosphere. Change is normal, life on Earth is inherently 219 risky; it always has been. The two reports, however, make it seem that environmental 220 change is apocalyptic and irreversible. It is not (Botkin 2014 
234 Mini-scientists and the education of future citizens 235 A point important to Fensham is his stress upon the educational goal of producing science-236 informed citizens, seeing this as preferable to the goal of producing mini-scientists. He 237 sees the former as more realistic and the latter is what he seems to consider is our goal for 238 secondary students. This juxtaposition needs some unpicking. We have no disagreement 239 about science-informed citizenry; indeed our entire paper centres on what should be 240 achieved for all students through the study of science with that as a main goal. However, 241 reducing our emphasis upon investigative activities concerned with climate change to the 242 placing of students in the role of mini-scientists, as that term has traditionally been 243 understood, misses the point. The research we have personally conducted (see 244 Bryce 2011, 2012) has been with teachers implementing cooperative learning incorpo-245 rating both practical lab work research and internet and textbook searches in order to 246 combine the 'learning of science, the learning to do science, and the learning about 247 science'. What these lessons achieve unites the introduction of young students to practical 248 experimentation with their learning about what scientists in the field in question are 249 reporting-corroborations, conflicts, and so forth. They generate real time discussion 250 where the teacher can respond to student queries and debate. Following in-depth interviews 251 with these teachers, we could readily detect that the emphasis of their discussions was to 252 'practice democratic citizenship' (of the five evident purposes across the sample ques-253 tioned). This was in contrast to humanities teachers whose emphases for their classroom 254 discussions were concerned with the development of reasoning skills and open-ended 255 enquiry. For us, putting students in the role of mini-scientists means with a necessarily 256 contemporary meaning of the word 'scientist', one whose commitments are to peers, the 257 public and communities, as well as to the subject matter itself. Thus we do not see mini-258 scientists/science-informed citizens as 'alternative images' for school science, as does 259 Fensham. These should be complementary images and we would argue enable a workable 260 balance of 'collegial trust' and 'scientific scepticism' to be achieved in practice, targets T. G. K. Bryce 
which Fensham seems to regard as better achieved through the analysis of suitable dramas 262 enacted for the purposes of educating science-informed citizens. 263
It is important to note that Scottish science education, which is the cultural environment 264 from which we hail, is undergoing a series of curricular and structural reforms under the 265 auspices of a 'Curriculum for Excellence'. As part of this reform, the purpose of science 266 education has been re-oriented away from the traditional goal of science education for the 267 production of future scientists (the 'pipeline' view) towards the development of students as 268 scientifically literate citizens (Day and Bryce 2013) . However, this re-orientation has not 269 translated-so far-into the desired shift in science teachers' thinking about the purpose of 270 science education, mostly due to the fact that the documents issued to them identifying the 271 'principles and practice' and 'experiences and outcomes' and used by them to focus the 272 content and context of what they teach, have continued to focus on the learning of and the 273 learning to do science, to the detriment of learning about science and its relationship with 274 society. 275
While we wholeheartedly subscribe to the goal of developing students as scientifically 276 literate citizens (particularly the vision II orientation towards scientific literacy), we also 277 recognize that the prevailing culture of Scottish science teachers currently subscribes to the 278 traditional 'pipeline 'view of the goal for science education. In Bryce and Day (2014), we 279 present our analysis in a manner that would be accessible for science teachers regardless of 280 their alignment with a vision I or vision II orientation towards scientific literacy. But we 281 focus our analysis more on the development of critical awareness in the development of 282 students' scientific literacy rather than placing students in the role of mini-scientists as 283 Fensham suggests.
dos Santos's position
285 The article by dos Santos (2014) indicates strong support for the thrust of our paper. He 286 welcomes the discussion of climate change in school science and illustrates answers to our 287 three research questions by reference to recent investigations of his own in Brazil. He too 288 found that students were not inclined to be sceptical in the course of their normal science 289 studies and required to be taught ''how to detect bias in scientific claims'' (p. 667). In the 290 research he describes, students were exposed to biased, alarmist newspaper reports and 291 individual students' points of view regarding the political context of the climate change 292 debate were made explicit. Thus he concludes that classroom discussion of the political 293 issues surrounding global warming should take place in science. We object to one point 294 which is repeated several times by the author: that is the assertion that we somehow 295 confined our analysis to 'confirmation bias'. We most certainly discussed it in relation to 296 research and thinking, and in some detail, both in general and in relation to what is evident 297 amongst climate researchers. And we also discussed related issues like conflicting evidence 298 and alternative perspectives on how data might be analysed. But we don't ''propose 299 confirmation bias'' (as per his abstract), nor, in conveying the scientific view, do we 300 '' reduce the discussion of global warming issues to the confirmation bias and the con-301 ceptual understanding of the controversy'' (p. 672). Perhaps something has been lost in the 302 translation from Portuguese to English here and dos Santos only means to seek a widening 303 of the debate to include political issues more thoroughly. If so, he could have made explicit 304 concessions to our analysis of both the public and the political debates (including, for 305 example, the climate-gate affairs). The serious challenge however is how science teachers 306 might be persuaded to bring socio-political issues into their lessons, given all the rather Scepticism 
307 negative research findings which have been published in the last ten years or so concerning 308 what science teachers are disposed to do. 309
As a point of clarification, we suggest that as part of students' development towards 310 becoming more critically aware (in our view a vital component of students' developing 311 scientific literacy), science teachers need to support students' learning towards being able 312 to identify and reason through potentially biased information, whether it is political, 313 ideological or, in the case of some scientists, confirmation bias. We would suggest that this 314 perspective aligns well with the development of students' socio-scientific reasoning as 315 suggested by Sadler, Barab, and Scott (2007) . In addition, the main thrust of our argument 316 is for the maintenance of the discussion's complexity rather than its reduction to a trite 317 sequence of activities designed to reduce the learning process to thinking skills required to 318 identify confirmation bias.
319 Political literacy and scientific literacy?
320 Whilst we agree with dos Santos's suggestion that students ought to take into account 321 different political perspectives during any discussion in the global warming debate, we 322 would argue that the co-development of students' political literacy, in conjunction with 323 scientific literacy, requires science teachers to be clear (conceptually) as to what constitutes 324 political literacy. They need also to be able to recognise which elements of any such 325 discussion relate specifically to its development. We would argue that the term political 326 literacy is itself somewhat ill defined and concur with the view that it extends beyond 327 merely acquiring knowledge and understanding of the political system (Eurydice 2012) and 328 the party political dogma of the political class of the nation (whatever nation that might 329 be). 330
Sir Bernard Crick has suggested that 'political literacy' was a term invented to mean 331 that someone should have the knowledge, skills and values to be effective in public life 332 (Crick 2007 ). The challenge is to help students to read issues and events from a political 333 perspective. That involves students knowing where, when and how decisions are made in 334 society-at the local, national and international level; recognising one's right to be per-335 sonally involved with the issues under discussion; being familiar with a range of political 336 ideas, language and forms of argument; developing a personal set of political values, while 337 having the skills and confidence to apply them in practice; being able to engage effectively 338 in dialogue with others on issues of shared political concern. In essence, we suggest that 347 Furthermore, we would also concur with Sadler and Zeidler when they suggest that ''… 348 vision II Scientific Literacy moves away from prioritizing decontextualized science 349 concepts and focuses instead on understandings and use of science in situations removed 350 from traditional boundaries of science… [and] emphasizes an approach that is broader in 351 scope, involving personal decision-making about contextually embedded issues'' (p. 910). In the Scottish context, as a consequence of the lack of an integrated curriculum in 394 secondary education and the current general feeling among Scottish science teachers of 395 being under-prepared to discuss complex issues such as climate change, when such dis-396 cussions do take place they are dealt with on a superficial level. Potentially this gives rise 397 to the adoption of naive beliefs about how to deal with and resolve such matters. When 398 dealing with them, the pitfall of limiting teaching to the micro level, i.e. teaching students 399 how to reduce their ecological footprint or adopting good ecological behaviours, should be 400 minimised because solutions to many ecological problems, such as climate change, may Scepticism 
In addition, other factors affecting their approach to socio-scientific discussion include 444 their understanding of the role that science plays within modern society. This impacts 445 strongly on their perceptions of the goals of science education (the development of sci-446 entifically literate citizens or the training of future generations of scientists) and how they T. G. K. Bryce 
The quotation from Haack (1995) which we cited at the start of this article emphasises 479 the importance of keeping scientific warrant (the evidential basis for any scientific claim) 480 and societal acceptance (the standing of any claim in the eyes of the wider community) 481 ''appropriately correlated'' in our recognition of what constitutes science. In her discussion, 482 Haack then describes her ideal of scientists: 490 With appropriate guidance and support, science teachers have the potential to give young 491 students an appreciation of the work of such people. And, should some of these students be 492 inspired and capable, teachers should be able to direct their specialist studies to enable 493 them to so participate in ensuing scientific careers. 494
